1) Introduction: Jeffrey G. Williamson and market integration 1
Market integration has been one of the major issues in Williamson's research, since his pioneering book on Late Nineteenth-century American Development (Williamson 1974) .
His more recent work, most notably his book with Kevin O'Rourke (1999) Apparently, scholars have been quite busy in tackling the first two questions. Indeed, integration of commodity markets is a hot topic in economic history: in the last year alone, the four major journals in the discipline have published six papers on this issue (Jacks 2005 a and b, Dobado-Marrera 2005 , Trenkler-Wolf 2005 , Shuie 2005 and Klovland 2005 , and a lot of other work is in progress. Yet, Williamson's agenda is still largely unexplored O'Rourke (2002 O'Rourke ( , 2003 . In fact, most of the current research aims at testing with increasingly sophisticated econometrics, whether the markets violated the law of one price -i.e. whether they were efficient in the Fama (1970) definition. This is a different, although related issue. In fact, a degree of efficiency is a pre-condition for integration, but it is unlikely that inefficiency was so substantial as to prevent integration altogether. We believe that this latter is the really important story and that Williamson's research agenda deserves to be put back on the centre stage. To this aim, in this paper, we focus on the market for wheat and consider the process of integration (or lack of it) from the early 19 th century to present. The next Section deals with price convergence between the United States and the United Kingdom, the archetypal producer and consumer countries. Section Three explores the patterns of integration in a wider range of countries,
Williamson's "Atlantic" economy. Section Four assesses the importance of domestic versus international convergence. Section Five deals with the causes of integration, and section Six concludes.
2) What happened, I: price convergence across the Atlantic
As a starting point, Graph 1 compares ratios of wheat prices in the United Kingdom with prices in New York and Chicago (1840 to present). Both series fluctuate widely in the short run -so the graph reports also the results of a Kernel fitting The long-term trend of the UK-New York is unambiguously downward from the 1830s to the end of the century. However, the process was not particularly fast: price gap declined at a yearly rate of -0.57% p.a. from 1841 to 1900, i.e. by about a third over the whole period. The convergence was much faster between United Kingdom and Chicago: in the same years, the ratio fell by two thirds (rate of change -1.78% The Paris-Chicago price differential declined from the 1840s to the 1920s. Price convergence was however slower than between United Kingdom and Chicago (the rate is only -0.94% from 1840 to 1900) and, above all, it was accounted for entirely by the integration of the domestic American market. In fact, the Paris-New York differential increased almost continuously throughout the whole 19 th century. Until the 1840s, wheat prices were lower in Paris than in New York so that prices converged from below. This trend must reflect independent developments in the two countries, as France did not export wheat to New York. But the price ratio went on growing also later: for instance in 1870-1900 it increased by 20% while the United Kingdom-New York ratio in the same years decreased by about the same amount. The (straightforward) explanation of these trends can be postponed to Section Five: here is it sufficient to stress the difference with the British experience.
3) What happened, II: price convergence in the wide Atlantic economy
The graphical analysis of the previous section is too cumbersome to be replicated for a number of markets/countries large enough to be representative of the whole Atlantic economy. A much simpler measure of market integration is the coefficient of variation:
a decrease corresponding to σ-convergence. One can resort to two sources, the impressive database collected by Jacks ( 7 This "core" group includes 4 markets in Austria-Hungary, 3 in Belgium, 12 in France, 2 or 3 (depending on the years) in Norway, 12 in the United Kingdom and 4 to 7 (depending on the year) in the USA. Further 8 markets can be added including Spain, but these series stop in 1907.
The results are very similar. In two cases, Austria-Hungary and the United States, it is possible to extract different samples of cities (Austria-Hungary a and b, USA a, b and c). The data are available at www.sfu.ca/~djacks/ 8 The Atlantic economy consists of the whole Europe, including Russia (until 1913), Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania, and its Western offshoots (North America, Oceania and Argentina). Population from Maddison (2003) , wheat production from Mitchell (1998 a, b and c) . The countries of the "core" sample accounted for only 44.5% of production and 44% of the population of the "Atlantic" economy before 1913. However, a χ 2 test fails to reject the hypothesis that the country distribution(s) of population and wheat production are equal in the sample and in the universe. Price converged until the late 1870s and diverged quite fast in the 1880s and early 1890s
(the backlash), while dispersion remained roughly constant in the last fifteen years of the period. On the even of the War, the coefficient of variation of prices in "core" countries was slightly higher than in the early 1830s 1899 -1902 # all countries 1911 # all countries -13, except Italy (1888 # all countries -1890 and Spain (1905 Spain ( -1907 Sources: Italy: Federico (2005a ), Sweden: Jorberg (1972 ; all other data from Jacks (2005) As expected, prices converged in all countries but two, Norway and Sweden. The integration was the faster the higher the initial level of dispersion was. It can be estimated that a 10% higher initial coefficient of variation augmented the absolute rate of change by 0.15 points. Unfortunately, about half of the series (lower part of Table 1 ) are useless for a long-term comparison, as they cover only a part of the period. The comparable series (upper part of Table1) show that price convergence accelerated throughout the century.
However, in four out of six cases (Austria-Hungary, France, United Kingdom and in the United States), half or more of the total fall in price dispersion had been achieved by 1870. The importance of domestic integration in the first half of the century is confirmed by other research. Slaughter (1995) finds evidence a strong process of convergence in ante-bellum USA for a wide range of goods (omitting wheat but including flour). Ejrnaes and Persson (2000) argue that a French national market for wheat was already well developed by the mid-19 th century. Federico (forthcoming) shows that wheat prices in
Italy converged in two distinct phases, the 1840s and 1850s, and the 1870s and early 1880s. Metzler (1974) speculates, admittedly on the basis of very limited evidence, that integration in Tsarist Russia had started well before 1893.
If domestic integration went on throughout the century, the sharp increase in world-wide dispersion must have been caused by divergence among countries. This was indeed the case, but, as table 2 shows, only for some countries. Both the anti-integration backlash of the years 1870-1890 and the stagnation of the years to World War One can be attributed solely to the divergence among protectionist countries 11 . Price convergence among "free-trade" countries went on and even accelerated relative to the pre-1870 years.
11 "Protectionist" Europe includes Austria, France, Norway (belonging to Sweden until 1905) and Spain, while "free-market Europe" the United Kingdom (in spite of the Corn Laws) and Belgium. The row "free world" includes the United States and "free-market" European countries. All country is considered as a single market So far, each component of total change has been considered in isolation. It is possible to estimate their contribution to integration (or dis-integration) of the "world" market with a simple variance analysis. Total variance is decomposed into i) domestic (within country) variance; ii) variance between protected countries and "free trade world" or "free" for short; iii) variance among "free" countries and iv) variance among protectionist countries 12 .
Graph 5. Decomposition of "world" price variance, 1830 to 1913 improvement is overshadowed by the convergence within free countries which accounted for most of the reduction in price dispersion in the first stage. From the 1830s to the 1870s, it would have reduced total variance by 15 points, more than 90% of the total decline in that period. Afterwards, price differentials among free countries remained negligible, accounting for no more than 2-3% of "world" variance. As implicit in Table 2 , the backlash is to be attributed to the increase in the variance between free and protected world and that among protected countries. From the late 1870s to the mid 1890s, both increased by five times, accounting for about 40% each of the rise in total world variance.
However, in the long run, trends in these two components differed substantially. The variance among protected countries decreased both before the 1870s and from the mid1890s to the war, so that its effect in the long-run was fairly small (a 10% increase in total variance). In contrast, prices of the "free" and the "protected" world diverged in all the three periods. This component alone accounts for more than half the total increase in variance. Had this price gap remained constant throughout the whole period, total price dispersion on the eve of World War One would have been half its initial level.
Domestic integration cannot be considered in interwar years because, as said, Wheat studies cover only one market per country. This omission is less devastating that it seems.
In fact, before the war, all countries in the sample had attained quite a high level of integration, and it seems highly unlikely that the war-time destructions had changed this situation. It is nevertheless possible that political changes, such as the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, disrupted integration. However the case of Poland shows how resilient market integration was: a national market for wheat flour was organised few years after the birth from of the new nation (Trenkler and Wolf 2005) . Therefore, total variance in the interwar period is decomposed into i) variance between free-trade countries (United 13 Price dispersion was unusually low in the United States in 1831: the coefficient of variation in that year (0.09) was half the average of the other years of the decade.
Kingdom and overseas producers) and protected countries (France, Germany and Italy), ii) variance among protected countries, and iii) variance among free-trade countries. .4
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The results of the decomposition (graph. 6) are quite clear. The increase in total dispersion in the 1930s reflects the divergence between prices in "free" and "protected" countries. It caused total variance to increase by forty times from 1923 to 1939. In comparison to this rise, the contribution from the two other sources disappears, although in absolute terms it is far from negligible (total variance would have tripled even if the price gap between "free" and "protected" countries had remained constant).
These results are not shockingly new. However, three points deserve some stress: i) domestic integration mattered, and its timing differ deeply from that of international integration; ii) most of the action, both within and across countries, pre-date 1870, the conventional starting point of the first globalization; iii) the integration of "world" wheat market peaked in the early 1920s, when, according to the conventional wisdom, antiglobalizing forces were already gaining the upper hand. These stylized facts suggest that the level of market integration depended more on policy-determined barriers to trade than on changes in transaction costs.
6) Why did it happen? The causes of convergence
In theory, in a perfectly efficient market, the (quality-adjusted) price gap between two markets is equivalent to total transaction costs, which include transportation costs, barriers to trade (if any) and other costs, such as insurance charges, commissions and minor costs (short-term storage, porter charges and so on). The difference between these costs and the actual price gap measures the risk premium and inefficiency -i.e. the violations of the law of one price. In theory, were complete and accurate data on all costs available, one could measure the contribution to changes in transaction costs to price convergence (or divergence). The residual, if any, would measure changes in risk premium and/or efficiency of the market. Let us consider, for instance, the quality adjusted price gap between Chicago and London. From 1857-1865 to 1890-1900, it fell from 75% to 26% of the Chicago price, while transport costs declined only from 46% to 15% of the price. In other words, the measured residual decreased from 30% of the Chicago price to only 11% in the 1890s. These figures seem too high to be accounted for by other costs, even taking into account the small duty levied on import to the United Kingdom until 1869. In fact, transaction costs were unlikely to exceed 5-8%, possibly 10% of wheat price, and the two main items, commissions and insurance fees, were proportional to price. Therefore, the fall in the residual must reflect an improvement in pure market efficiency and/or a sharp decrease in the risk premium (itself evidence of improvement in the market), plus measurement errors, which should, however, be unbiased. It is impossible to be more precise or, a fortiori, to replicate this analysis for all the pairs of market for all the period. However, some insights can be obtained by considering separately the changes in two main items of costs -transportation and barriers to trade.
The best measure of long-term change of transportation costs is the so-called freight factor -i.e., the ratio of nominal freight to the price of wheat from the place of origin.
This method of deflation corresponds to the "iceberg" approach to transaction costs in trade models. Indeed, the Odessa-London freight, in nominal terms, halved from the early 1820s to the late 1860s (Harley 1989 Tab. 9) . Unfortunately, it is impossible to compute the freight factor, as prices in Odessa are not available before 1893. One has to use other price series, and the choice matters. From 1820-22 to 1849-51, the "freight factor" declined by One would be tempted to attribute the difference between domestic and transatlantic freight factor to the direct competition of railways. One must resist to this temptation. In fact, transportation from Chicago to New York remained cheaper by water ("lake and canal") than by rail until World War One and afterwards. 16 But the cost of domestic transportation fell much more than transatlantic freight: in 1857-1859, it cost 6.71 cents to ship a bushel of grain from Chicago to New York and 3.57 to forward it to the United Kingdom. In 1881-1883, the transatlantic freight had declined by 12% at 3.17 cents, while the cost of internal transport had plunged to 2.87 cents -i.e. by 60%. It seems implausible that such a big difference was caused only by differential technological change in shipping between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic. It might reflect change in market organization, such as a growing competition among domestic shippers (while transatlantic shipping was more competitive since the start). Or it might reflect the 15 The yearly rates of change for the whole period 1851-1990 is 0.12, and it reduces to 0.08 if one adds dummies for the Civil War years. The rate is -0.37 for the period 1850-1890, but it comes out positive (0.38) by adding the Civil War dummies. None of these rates is significant. The rates of change are -2.84 1890-1913, 2.18 for 1920-1938 (not significant) and -2.32 for 1950-1990. 16 By 1912, the lake and canal route cost 5.37 cents/bushel, versus 6.54 for the lake and rail and 9.73 for the all rail route (Chicago Board of trade, 1912) . By 1929, the lake and rail route for exported grain cost 10.42 and the all rail 12.37 cents/bushel. All European countries abolished their duties with outbreak of World War One and freedom to import accounts for the very high level of integration in the early 1920s. As the graph shows, duties were imposed again since the mid-1920s, but the real watershed was the Great Depression. Importing countries dramatically increased their duties, and resorted to new instruments, such as forcing millers to process a minimum share of national wheat (usually in excess of 95%), setting quotas and managing the whole wheat trade (Tracy 1989 , Federico 2005c . Also the traditionally free-trade United Kingdom followed this path for a couple of years, before letting imports from Commonwealth countries free after the Ottawa agreement of 1932 and subsidizing directly farmers (Rooth 1992 pp. 89-94 and 212-231) . In the United States, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, one of the first measures of the New Deal, set a minimum price for agricultural products after 1933 (Libecap 1998 pp. 186-196) 19 . Many of these policies were maintained well after the end of the emergency, until the 1990s. Indeed, price differential between Gulf States and Rotterdam, inclusive of duty, quite different from the series without duty (graph 9). d) The emphasis on transatlantic freight as a cause of convergence might be misplaced.
Domestic transportation costs also mattered a lot, and, above all, prices were largely determined by trade policies.
These statements refer to wheat and possibly to other cereals. Do they hold true for other commodities? The answer is not easy, because few studies deal with them (Froot, Kim and Rogoff 1995 , O'Rourke and Williamson 1994 , Slaughter 1995 , Klovland 2005 , Buyenka and Labys 2005 . It is impossible to draw any inference from their results, but it is possible to make some educated guesses on the basis of information about commodity-specific transaction costs. Freight rates for all primary commodities moved in parallel from the 1860s to World War One (Mohammed and Williamson 2004) 20 It is also likely that all commodities benefited from improvements in the circulation of information and in overall efficiency. However, one cannot rule out that the effect differed across commodities. For instance, the grading system was much less developed for other primary commodities than for wheat, and the quality problem was, if any, greater. 21 But trade policy differed quite markedly. Raw materials remained largely exempt from duties, and thus, ceteris paribus, integration must have been easier in the market for cotton or coal than in the market for grain. This inference is not necessarily true for manufactured goods, which were hit by protection. Given these contrasting influences, the least bad guess suggests that wheat may be fairly, although not fully, representative. However, this hypothesis, and all the conclusions of this paper, should be buttressed by further research. Williamson's research agenda still remains exciting and full of promise for our understanding of modern economic growth.
cumulated decrease amounts to 60% for wheat, 69% coal and 73% for cotton (MohammedWilliamson 2004) . 21 For instance there were 15 basic qualities of silk according to provenance and method of production -and the price range double (Federico 1997 This formula has been used to estimate the contribution of each component for graphs 5
and 6.
